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The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) has emerged 
as a powerful actor within the field of inter-state investment arbitration. However, as 
with other international institutions, its existence depends on continued acceptance by 
domestic actors. 
 
Relative to other international institutions, ICSID receives little public discussion, is 
largely unknown to voters and is absent from public opinion research. The Pew 
Research Center has tracked American support for free trade agreements and the 
policies of the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 1997 (spoiler alert: excepting 
the 2007-2008 period, more Americans think such agreements are good but around 
one-fifth have no opinion), and since 2008, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs 
has tracked American support for the International Criminal Court (ICC) (68-70% of 
Americans think the US should participate). This Perspective presents the first broad 
poll of the American public on ICSID and the results of a survey experiment on 
information provision. 
 
As part of the 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, 1,000 individuals 
were asked nine foreign policy questions, including questions about support for the 
WTO, the ICC and ICSID.
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 Approximately a quarter of the sample received a control 
version consisting of a brief introduction and the question concerning support for 
ICSID. 
 
“[ICSID] was established in 1965 to facilitate the settlement of 
disputes between countries and foreign investors. Use of ICSID courts 
is voluntary but binding when a provision for ICSID arbitration is 
written into investment contracts. Should U.S. citizens and 
corporations be subject to international court rulings from the 
ICSID?” 
Less than a third (32%) expressed support for ICSID, with 28% directly rejecting the 
idea that US citizens and corporations should be subject to ICSID rulings. Despite the 
relative obscurity of ICSID, less than 40% answered “Don’t know.” However, 
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averages obscure a strong partisan divide. Disaggregation by partisan self-
identification reveals much stronger support by Democrats (46% “Yes” versus 21% 
“No”) and rejection by Republicans (19% “Yes” versus 41% “No”). Independents fell 
in between and were more likely to respond “Don’t know” (46%).  
 




 “Every opinion is a marriage of information and predisposition.”2 Given the limited 
information provided in the question prompt, responses may correlate more strongly 
with predispositions than a considered opinion on the question at hand. Republicans 
are generally less supportive of US involvement in international organizations and 
may be responding simply to that aspect of the question. Given the institution’s 
obscurity, respondents’ preferences may be relatively weak and responsive to 
additional information. 
 
To isolate and understand how opinions would differ given more discussion of 
ICSID’s role, the remaining respondent pool received additional information 
concerning the economic benefits of ICSID, as well as the actors that helped establish 
ICSID. The establishment process was attributed to one of three randomly assigned 
groups: bipartisan Congressional action, Congressional Democrats and Congressional 
Republicans. 
 
“To dispel any concern that ICSID awards would be overridden in the 
U.S. court system, [Congress enacted, on a bipartisan basis | 
Congressional Democrats helped to enact | Congressional 
Republicans helped to enact], a statute obligating U.S. courts to give 
ICSID awards "the same full faith and credit" as if the award was a 
judgment of a court in the United States. Ensuring compliance with 
ICSID awards reduces uncertainty for foreign companies. This 
agreement to abide by common rules makes the U.S. more competitive 
for foreign direct investment dollars, which create jobs in the United 
States. Should U.S. citizens and corporations be subject to 
international court rulings from the ICSID?” 
 
Table 2 shows the change in the levels of support caused by each of the three 
treatments. The bipartisan message generated a 6% increase in support for ICSID, but 
was the only treatment to increase support. Close examination of partisan responses 
suggests that party politics remain active. Democrats responded positively to the 
bipartisan message (+11%), but neither Independents nor Republicans were similarly 
moved. In fact, the slight gains in support for ICSID among Independents and 
Republicans (4% and 2%, respectively) were more than offset by increased rejection 
of ICSID (5% and 6%, respectively).   
 
Support ICSID Democrats Independents Republicans Total
Yes 46% 27% 19% 32%
No 21% 27% 41% 28%
Don't Know 33% 46% 41% 40%
Total Obs. 94 85 59 238
Pearson chi2(4) =  16.1866   Pr = 0.003
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Table 2: Responses, by partisan type and experimental treatment 
 
 
Both the Democratic and Republican messages resulted in countervailing effects from 
partisans. The Democratic message diminished rejection of ICSID among Democrats 
by 11%, but the same message increased rejection of ICSID among Republicans and 
Independents. Similarly, the Republican message increased support for ICSID by 
11% among Republicans, but served simply to increase uncertainty among 
Democrats. “Don’t know” responses from Democrats rose by 17%. In contrast, the 
additional information provided in all the treatments declined the percent of 
Independents answering “Don’t know”, but served to equally increase Independents’ 
support and rejection of ICSID. Partisan reaction to even the bipartisan message 
complicates the impact of attempting to move opinion. 
 
As it stands, support for ICSID falls behind both that of the WTO and the ICC. 
Raising ICSID from obscurity could increase support, but only if discussions remain 
politically neutral. Whether other framings of ICSID’s benefits—transparency, third 
party objectivity, US investors’ protection from foreign courts—would be more 
broadly effective remains an open question.  
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Support ICSID Democrats Independents Republicans Total
Base 46% 27% 19% 33%
Δ  Bipartisan Message 11% 4% 2% 6%
Δ  Democratic Message 0% 5% 3% 3%
Δ  Republican Message -9% 2% 11% 0%
Reject ICSID Democrats Independents Republicans Total
Base 21% 27% 41% 28%
Δ  Bipartisan Message -14% 5% 6% -2%
Δ  Democratic Message -11% 7% 2% -1%
Δ  Republican Message -8% 0% -9% -5%
"Don't Know" Democrats Independents Republicans Total
Base 33% 46% 41% 39%
Δ  Bipartisan Message 4% -9% -8% -4%
Δ  Democratic Message 11% -12% -5% -1%
Δ  Republican Message 17% -2% -2% 5%
Note: Sums of individual groups may appear to differ from 100% because of rounding.
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